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Induced abortion is one of the most popular, if not the most widely
used, single means of personal population control in the United
States and throughout the world today. In the United States,
however, criminal sanctions against performing abortions have
resulted in many pregnancies being terminated under septic con-
ditions by unskilled persons. The authors contend that our abortion
laws are badly in need of reform in order to bring them into con-
formity with accepted medical practice, and to permit termination
of pregnancy for medical and humanitarian reasons by qualified
physicians. Notwithstanding the religious opposition to efforts of
the medical profession and the public toward social progress, the
law of therapeutic abortion is on the threshold of change, either by
legislative enactment or court decisions.
I. ABORTION AND THE POPULATION CRISIS
Although there is general agreement that abortion will not be
a mass method of birth control in this country,' for a number of
reasons it is appropriate to consider the subject of induced abortion
in the context of dialogue over controlling an exploding population.
Judging from the universality and high incidence of induced abortion,
it becomes obvious that it is one of the most popular, if not the most
widely used, single means of "personal population control" in the
world today.2 This has been the case from at least the beginning
of man's recorded history.'
Estimates of induced abortion in the United States indicate that
more than one million are performed annually, or one out of every
* Member of the California Bar (Los Angeles).
** Associate Clinical Professor of Psychiatry, UCLA School of Medicine.
1 Drinan, "The Inviolability of the Right to be Born," 17 W. Res. L. Rev. 465,
467 (1965); George, "Current Abortion Laws: Proposals and Movement for Reform,"
17 IV. Res. L. Rev. 371, 374 (1965).
2 Kunmer, "The Problems of Abortion: The Personal Population Explosion," in
The Population Crisis and the Use of World Resources, Publication 2, World Academy
of Art and Science, The Hague, 1964; Population Council, Family Planning and
Population Programs-A Review of World Developments, noted in Newsweek, June 27,
1966, p. 63.
3 Bates, Criminal Abortion (1964); Gebhard, Pregnancy, Birth and Abortion
(1958); St. John-Stevas, The Right to Life (1964); Lader, Abortion (1966); Schur,
Crimes Without Victims (1965); Taussig, Abortion, Spontaneous and Induced (1936);
Abortion in the United States (Calderone ed. 1958).
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four or five pregnancies.4 Undoubtedly, the overwhelming majority
of these are in violation of existing law, which allows abortion only
to preserve the life of the mother.' Most abortions are undertaken
by married women with children.'
The abortion rate in other nations with restrictions similar to
those in the United States is considerably higher. In France and
Germany, for example, it has reached epidemic proportions.' Preg-
nancies terminated in those nations exceed live births, and the
mortality rate varies from one to eight percent.
Only in Japan has abortion been openly acknowledged as a method
of mass population control.' It was legalized in 1948 along with
requirements for maintaining minimal medical standards, and has
since reduced the birth rate by more than one-third. The crash
program of abortion, brought on by the serious population crisis
following World War II, did not offend the mores and religious
beliefs of the Japanese, however, as might be the case in the West.
Infanticide, as well as abortion, had been practiced in Japan even
in recent generations to control the size of the family. Along with
the legalizing of induced abortion, widespread encouragement has
been given by the government toward family planning through the
use of contraceptive devices, and the abortion rate is steadily drop-
ping.9
In Russia and Eastern Europe the restrictions against abortion
were considerably relaxed in 1955 and the few years following.'0
None of these governments show official concern with over-population,
however, since this is proscribed by Marxist philosophy. Moreover,
several of these countries have low birth rates and some of them, for
example, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, pursue an active population
growth policy; they do not pursue a policy of contraceptive encourage-
ment or family planning in conjunction with legalized abortion. Though
4 Kopp, Birth Control in Practice 222 (1934); Lader, Abortion 2 (1966); Leavy &
Kummer, "Criminal Abortion: Human Hardship and Unyielding Laws," 35 So. Cal. L.
Rev. 123, 124 n.5 (1962) ; Niswander, "Medical Abortion Practices in the United States,"
17 W. Res. L. Rev. 403 (1965).
5 See the comprehensive "Summary of State Laws on Abortion," in Appendix B,
Sands, "The Therapeutic Abortion Act: An Answer to the Opposition," 13 U.C.LA.L.
Rev. 285, 310 (1966).
6 See authorities cited note 4 supra.
7 Breitenecker, "Abortion in the German-Speaking Countries of Europe," 17 W.
Res. L. Rev. 553, 554 (1965).
8 Tietze, "Induced Abortion and Sterilization as Methods of Fertility Control"
Nat'l Comm'n on Maternal Health, Publication 27 (1965).
9 Lader, Abortion 132 (1966).
10 Tietze, supra note 8. See also Lader, Abortion 125-31 (1966).
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comprehensive statistics are unavailable from many of these nations,
Czechoslovakia and Hungary show substantial reductions of live
births with the increase of legal abortion.
It should be noted that physical after-effects of abortion are rare
in Japan and in those Eastern European nations which provide
statistics, and the mortality rate reported is exceedingly low.11 Post-
abortion psychiatric sequellae are mild if not rare, and this has
generally been confirmed by recent studies in other areas.12
A. Changing Concepts of Population; The Woman vs. The Fetus
Abortion is related to population in another way. Throughout
history the severity of the restrictions on abortion depended upon
the need to increase the population.13 Whether the prohibition was
designed primarily to protect the mother vis-A-vis the fetus usually
turned on whether a particular community was peaceful and affluent
on the one hand, or on the other hand, was facing the challenge of
war or was aggressively extending its own power, wealth and ideology.
Societies which enacted severe penalties, sometimes even death,
for destruction of the embryo or fetus were ancient Sparta, Japan
and Russia prior to World War II, Nazi Germany and other cultures
bent upon not losing a single potential worker or warrior. 4 On the
other hand, the Greek city states, ancient Rome and Egypt made
abortion the basis of a well-ordered population policy. 5 The more
mature societies placed primary stress on protection of the woman
by relaxing the prohibition as she grew older and when her safety
might be endangered by continuation of the pregnancy. Increasingly,
this has been the case in the modern world, where the stress on soldier-
manpower has lessened in favor of controlling an exploding population.
In modern times the secular law of the Western world has
provided primary protection to the mother, as is initially indicated
by the stated exception in most statutes: "to preserve the life of the
mother." 6 Beyond this, the majority view in the United States is that
the woman-abortee is not an accomplice to the offense, but a victim
of it.' She is seldom, if ever, prosecuted and is usually granted im-
11 Ibid.
12 Tietze, supra note 8, at 1168. See also Kummer, "Post-Abortion Psychiatric
Illness-A Myth?" 119 Am. J. Psychiatry 980 (1963).
13 Breitenecker, supra note 7, at 553; Leavy & Kummer, "Criminal Abortion: A
Failure of Law," 50 A.BA.J. 52, 53 (1964).
14 Ibid.
15 Lader, Abortion 76 (1966).
16 Sands, supra note 5, at Appendix B.
17 Annot., 139 A.L.R. 993 (1942).
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munity from prosecution,18 sometimes by statute,19 when her testimony
is needed to convict the abortionist. Moreover, an attempted abortion
is sufficient to fall within most substantive felony statutes, and
miscarriage need not result ° In many states it is not even an element
of the prosecution's case that the woman was in fact pregnant. It
is enough that the abortionist believed her to be pregnant and
performed an act upon her with the intent to terminate a pregnancy.21
But the moral position is stressed by those with orthodox
religious views, overwhelmingly the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic
Church.22 Some Orthodox Jewish authorities also take this position, 3
but they have not campaigned as vigorously as the Catholic Church
against relaxation of abortion laws. The restrictive views of the
ancient Hebrews24 were adopted unmodified by Christianity and
early canon law, but Protestantism, in general, has come to accept
termination of pregnancy when the woman's health or life is en-
dangered; it is now considered primarily a medical problem for each
family to decide after competent medical and clerical consultation,
with primary consideration being given the woman.25 Whereas Judaic
Law has evolved to accept preservation of the woman's life, if not
her health, as an indication for therapeutic abortion,2" Catholicism
continues to the present to absolutely prohibit intentionally induced
abortion for any reason whatever, even to preserve the woman's
life.2
Although the Catholic hierarchy denies neither the high abortion
rate, nor that the great majority of medical opinion today would
terminate pregnancy for reasons other than to preserve life, it stresses
the importance of maintaining the present penal sanctions as a
18 Williams, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law 153 (1957).
19 E.g., Cal. Pen. Code § 1324.
20 Regan, "The Law of Abortion," in Legal Medicine 834 (Gradwohl ed. 1954).
21 Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d 1393 (1956).
22 Sands, "The Therapeutic Abortion Act: An Answer to the Opposition," 13
U.CL.A.L. Rev. 285 (1966).
23 E.g., Jakobovits, "Jewish Views on Abortion," 17 W. Res. L. Rev. 480 (1965).
24 Exodus 21:22-23.
25 Therapeutic Abortion 164 (Rosen ed. 1954) ; Model Penal Code § 207.11, comment
(Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
26 Cohen, "A Jewish View Toward Therapeutic Abortion," in Therapeutic Abortion
166 (Rosen ed. 1954).
27 Canon 2350 § 1; 8 Augustine, Commentary on Canon Law 397 (1931); 3
Bouscaren, Canon Law Digest 669 (1954); 2 Woywood, Practical Commentary on the
Code of Canon Law 545 (Smith rev. 1948); Pope Pius XI, Casti Canubil (1930), as
reprinted in Ass'n of Am. L. Schools, Selected Essays on Family Law 132, 149 (Sayre
ed. 1950).
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deterrent to widespread sexual promiscuity with the resulting "break-
down in public morality."28 The poor deterrent effect, however, is
indicated by four studies which show Catholics to comprise over
twenty percent of all abortion patients. This almost equals the
Catholic ratio in the United States, twenty-five percent of the total
population."
This Calvinist concept of enforcing a moral philosophy through
fear of punishment in matters of sex is not limited to the Catholic
Church or other orthodox religions. It is Anglo-American in nature
and relates, in large part, to our strongly ingrained New England
Puritanism, with its dismal obsession with sex and immorality3
Notwithstanding the primary protection given the woman by the
law, until recent years a number of courts on the surface have per-
petuated the restrictive view, based upon the early Judaeo-Christian
tenets, that interference with propagation is a moral question involving
a crime against the normal functions "of nature by which the human
race is propagated and continued."" But such views are changing
rapidly, especially with respect to abortion for medical and human-
itarian reasons.
B. Abortion and Modern Concepts
Abortion has been a taboo subject, although the taboos seemed
to be more concerned with the discussion of abortion rather than
the undertaking of the act itself." There is a direct derivation of
attitudes concerning abortion from our prevailing attitudes toward
sex in general; it is apparent that induced abortion is a definite part
of our social mores, but society steadfastly refuses to acknowledge
the fact.
In recent years, however, abortion increasingly has come into
more popular discussion.3 Medical science in most cases can now
save a woman's life, strictly speaking, and still bring the fetus to
birth, but current medical practice often prescribes termination of
28 Byrn, "The Abortion Question: A Nonsectarian Approach," 11 Catholic Law.
315, 321 (1965) ; Drinan, supra note 1 at 476. See also Jakobovits, supra note 23 at 494,
for the similar Orthodox Jewish view.
29 Lader, Abortion 7, 177 n.5 (1966).
30 Id. at 81, 89.
31 Mills v. Commonwealth, 13 Pa. 621 (1850); Foster v. State, 182 Wis. 298, 196
N.W. 233 (1923); 32 Ind. L.J. 193 (1957).
32 Taussig, Abortion, Spontaneous and Induced 396 (1936).
33 Recent books cited note 3 supra. Several dozen other major contributions have
appeared in law reviews and medical journals in the last few years, many of which are
cited in this paper.
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pregnancy to preserve the woman's health. 4 The medical profession
is raising a protest to the interposition of the prohibitory law between
physician and patient in this manner, and the public is beginning
to demand the right to follow the physician's advice when that advice
is within current standards and medically sound.35 Medicine and the
public are becoming more aware of serious congenital deformities
being caused by disease, drugs and other interferences in early
pregnancy.36 Also, there is increasing resistance to brushing under the
rug the terrible injustice of forcing birth upon the victim of sexual
assault.3 7
It is recently noticeable that the subject of abortion is riding
the wave of the grand dialogue over the population explosion and
the need for birth control programs.3 In poor and underdeveloped
nations, where it is impossible to stem the burgeoning birth rate
with contraception and sex education, abortion on a major scale
may be the only means of avoiding mass starvation, not to speak of
providing the masses of people with a decent life. 9 The Indian
government now has such a proposal under study.49 Abortions could
be performed in such a program only on a voluntary basis, of course,
and in societies whose mores would not oppose it. Such a program
should include a broad companion effort of education and encourage-
ment toward family planning through contraception,41 as was done in
Japan.
In the United States and other western countries, abortion will
not be considered as a mass method of population control. Existing
mores, religious beliefs and social restrictions will not fully accept
legalized abortion. Sex education, family planning and the use of
contraceptives may be enough to control the growing birth rate,
and, hopefully, will reduce the high incidence of clandestine abortion
by unskilled persons. Presently in the testing stage are drugs and
devices which will prevent implantation of the fertilized egg on the
34 Niswander, "Medical Abortion Practices in the United States," 17 W. Res. L.
Rev. 403, 406 (1965).
35 E.g., the recent experience in California, discussed in notes 73, 79, 80 infra and
related text.
36 Niswander, supra note 34, at 406.
37 Beilenson, "The Therapeutic Abortion Act: A Small Measure of Humanity," 41
Los Angeles B. Bull. 316, 344 (1966).
38 Family Planning and Population Programs-A Review of World Developments,
supra note 2.
39 Lader, Abortion 94 (1966).
40 Ibid.
41 Id. at 131.
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uterine wall, and this may further reduce the rate of illegal abor-
tions. 42 But there will always be unwanted pregnancies, and if any
restrictions exist at all there will be abortions outside the scope of
accepted medical practice and under dangerous conditions. That is,
people will continue to use induced abortion as their own method of
"personal population control."
There remains one area which cannot be overlooked in societies,
such as in the United States, which tolerate only a moderate course of
birth control; namely, the problem of therapeutic abortion. The Scandi-
navian nations also regard therapeutic abortion as a "last resort"43 and
have already met the problem by providing broader socio-medical
counseling to pregnant women and by relaxing the prohibitory
law.44 The law allows termination of pregnancy where it endangers
the mother's health, where the child may be born with a serious
deformity, where pregnancy resulted from rape or incest, and in
some limited cases for socio-medical reasons.45 Western European
nations are likewise tending in this direction.48
The dialogue in the United States surrounding abortion for
health and humanitarian grounds is rapidly coming to a head, and
the law of therapeutic abortion is undergoing a major change.
II. THERAPEUTIC ABORTION AND THE LAW
Existing law in most states is interpreted to prohibit the licensed
physician from prescribing or undertaking termination of pregnancy
to treat a woman's health. In forty-one states such an act is a criminal
offense,47 and in most states it is a felony 48 to procure or attempt
to procure an abortion by any means, except when it is necessary to
preserve the life of the woman. Louisiana prohibits all abortions
42 See Meloy, "Preimplanation Fertility Control and the Abortion Laws," 41
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 183 (1964), where the question was raised whether these methods
terminate pregnancy in violation of existing law.
43 Model Penal Code § 207.11 at 165-66, comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959);
Skalts & Norgaard, "Abortion Legislation in Denmark," 17 W. Res. L. Rev. 498, 519
(1965); Gebhard, Pregnancy, Birth and Abortion 221 (1958); Abortion in the United
States 14 (Calderone ed. 1958).
44 Lader, Abortion 117 (1966).
45 Skalts & Norgaard, supra note 43, at 509. The 1956 Danish law states that a
woman may be deemed unfit to take proper care of her child.
40 Breitenecker, supra note 7, at 553. For the English Rule see Rex v. Bourne, 1
K.B. 687 (1939); Mathew, "The Present State of the Law of Abortion," 4 Med. Sci. & L.
170, 175 (1964) ; Williams, "Legal and Illegal Abortions," 4 Brit. J. Crim. 557, 562 (1964).
47 See Sands, supra note 22, at Appendix B.
48 A "high misdemeanor" in New Jersey; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:87-1 (1953).
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without exception,49 but provides a different standard for physicians
than for non-physicians. The physician's license can be suspended
unless it appeared, with concurring medical opinion, that the woman's
life was in peril.5 0
Alabama,51 Colorado,5" New Mexico53 and the District of Colum-
bia54 expressly provide that an abortion may be performed to preserve
the woman's health or protect her from serious bodily injury. The
same result appears to have been reached by the courts of Massa-
chusetts55 and New Jersey5 6 the statutes of which prohibit "unlawful"
abortion. Pennsylvania has a similar statute, but no cases have
interpreted it.5" In Maryland a physician may perform an abortion
if, with concurring medical opinion, he is satisfied "that no other
method will secure the safety of the mother." s Although no cases
interpret this statute, an Attorney General of Maryland has opined
in a letter that "safety" means "health." 59
The laws of Louisiana and Oregon provide an instructive study.
Oregon prohibits all abortions unless necessary to save the life of the
woman60 but, like Louisiana, provides a broader standard when
regulating the practice of its licensed physicians. Notwithstanding
the criminal law, a doctor's license may be suspended or revoked
only for
procuring or aiding or abetting in procuring an abortion unless such
is done for the relief of a woman whose health appears in peril
because of her pregnant condition after due consultation with another
duly licensed medical physician and surgeon who is not an associate
or relative of the physician or surgeon and who agrees that an
abortion is necessary."1
The Oregon Supreme Court ruled that a physician who undertakes
49 La. Rev. Stat. § 14:87 (Supp. 1952).
50 La. Rev. Stat. § 37:1285(6) (1950).
51 Ala. Code tit. 14, § 9 (1958).
52 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40-2-3 (1953).
53 N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-5-3 (1964).
54 D.C. Code Ann. § 22-201 (1961).
55 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 272, § 19 (1956); Commonwealth v. Brunelle, 341
Mass. 675, 171 N.E.2d 850 (1961); Commonwealth v. Wheeler, 315 Mass. 394, 53 N.E2d
4 (1944).
56 NJ. Stat. Ann. § 2A:87-1 (1953); State v. Siciliano, 21 N.J. 249, 121 A.2d 490
(1956); State v. Murphy, 27 N.J.L. 112 (Sup. Ct. 1858).
57 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 18 § 4718 (1963); Sands, supra note 22, at 288.
58 Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 3 (1957).
59 Therapeutic Abortion 152 (Rosen ed. 1954).
60 Ore. Rev. Stat. § 163.060 (1965).
61 Ore. Rev. Stat. § 677.190(2) (1965).
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to terminate pregnancy and meets the requirements of this regulatory
statute is not subject to criminal prosecution.6 2 Thus, the actions of a
licensed physician in administering sound and accepted medical
treatment are removed from the ambit of the penal law which is
designed primarily to protect the woman from unskilled abortionists.
But the statutes and case law of these states have not always
been indicative of interpretations and practices in the more populous
areas of the nation, and it is said that physicians and hospital ther-
apeutic abortion committees in Louisiana and Oregon, as well as in
the other states which allow abortion for health reasons, still interpret
the law strictly so as to discriminate against those who cannot obtain,
or cannot afford to obtain, the right doctor and the right hospital
in order to secure relief. 3 We must look to the more populous states,
then, for valid indications of current trends.
California courts; in the absence of legislation similar to that
of Louisiana and Oregon, have begun to speak in terms of separating
the licensed medical practioner from those who risk the lives of
women for a profit. In the case of a physician, the prosecutor is
held to a higher standard of proof that the abortion was not necessary
to preserve the woman's life,64 and/or that the physician's specific
intent was to terminate pregnancy for a reason other than to preserve
life. 5 Furthermore, it is suggested in the California decisions that
preservation of life might include danger to health as well.6 Precedent
for such interpretion comes, inter alla, from the famous charge to the
jury in the 1938 English case of Rex v. Bourne,67 the standard followed
in that country. s The California court also pointed out the inadequacy
of existing law in not requiring pregnancy to be terminated by a
medical doctor in a licensed hospital.69 These trends are not with-
62 State v. Buck, 200 Ore. 87, 262 P.2d 495 (1953).
63 Statements by Drs. Alan F. Guttmacher and Robert E. Hall, of New York City,
presented at a panel discussion on "How We Can Update Our Abortion Laws" at the
annual convention of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists in
Chicago, May 4-5, 1966.
64 People v. Ballard, 167 Cal. App. 2d 803, 335 P.2d 204 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
See also a subsequent prosecution, People v. Ballard, 218 Cal. App. 2d 295, 32 Cal. Rptr.
233 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
65 People v. Abarbanel, 239 Adv. Cal. App. 24, 48 Cal. Rptr. 336 (Dist. Ct. App.
1965).
66 People v. Ballard, 167 Cal. App. 2d 803, 814, 335 P.2d 204, 212 (Dist. Ct. App.
1959).
67 1 K.B. 687 (1939).
68 Mathew, supra note 46, at 175; Williams, supra note 46, at 562-63.
69 People v. Ballard, 218 Cal. App. 2d 295, 308, 32 Cal. Rptr. 233, 241 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1963).
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out significance in considering the pressure now building toward an
impending change in the law of therapeutic abortion.
A. Medical Practice and the Changing Law
The law of therapeutic abortion is on the verge of change, to
bring it into conformity with current medical thought and practice.
Movements have been underway in several of the more populous
states, 70 but thus far have been unsuccessful because of strong op-
position from the leadership of the Roman Catholic Church and Cath-
olic hospitals. The overwhelming majority of the medical profession, 71
and the general public as well,72 favor modification of existing law to
include health and humanitarian indications for lawful termination
of pregnancy.
The California experience offers the most recent and far-advanced
example of the impending reform. The Therapeutic Abortion Act,
introduced by Assemblyman Anthony C. Beilenson of Los Angeles,
after being studied by committees for three regular sessions of the
California Legislature (about five years) was reported out of the
Assembly Criminal Procedure Committee in 1965 with a "do pass"
recommendation. 3 Mr. Beilenson informed us that indications showed
sufficient votes on the floor of the lower house to pass the measure.
The bill, however, was referred to the Assembly Ways and Means
Committee for approval of a modest sum of money for supervision of
Hospital Therapeutic Abortion Commitees by the State Department of
Public Health. Tremendous last-minute pressure was exerted by prom-
inent Catholics on the members of that Committee, the majority of
which favored the bill, and the chairman saw to it that the measure was
killed without a vote.7 4
The Beilenson Bill was patterned after the Model Penal Code
provisions drafted by the American Law Institute75 and allowed
therapeutic abortion if there was substantial risk (1) of the woman's
70 Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York, and most recently in
California. See Lader, Abortion 111-16, 144 (1966); George, "Current Abortion Laws:
Proposals and Movements for Reform," 17 W. Res. L. Rev. 371 (1965).
71 The results of polls of physicians in New York State and at a recent AMA
meeting are reported in Lader, Abortion 144 (1966). The history of overwhelming
medical support for abortion legislation in California is reported in Sands, "The
Therapeutic Abortion Act: An Answer to the Opposition," 13 U.C.LTA.L. Rev. 285 (1966).
72 See text accompanying note 89 infra.
73 California Assembly Bill 1305, 1965 Regular (General) Session. See Sands, supra
note 71, for a detailed history of AB 1305.
74 Lader, Abortion 147 (1966), quoting a report from the San Francisco Chronicle.
75 Model Penal Code § 230.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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health being endangered by the pregnancy, or (2) of the child being
born with a grave defect, or (3) that the pregnancy resulted from
rape or incest. Conservative procedural safeguards required concurring
medical opinion and majority approval of a hospital therapeutic
abortion committee; the committees were to be supervised by the
State Department of Public Health. For rape and incest pregnancies,
consultation of the local district attorney was required to determine
if he objected to the conclusion that there had been a sexual assault,
and if he objected, the matter could be taken to the local court of
general jurisdiction for a priority determination of fact.
Passage of the Beilenson Bill was supported overwhelmingly by
the medical profession in California, as initially indicated by the
endorsements of the California Medical Association, the Bureau of
Maternal and Child Health, the California State Department of Public
Health, the California State Board of Health, and all the obstetrical
and gynecological societies in the State.7" A petition signed by more
than one thousand physicians, thirteen hundred clergymen, and one-
hundred-fifty prominent attorneys was submitted to the Criminal
Procedure Committee urging passage of the measure, and numerous
other interested groups and persons testified in favor of the bill. 7
The California Medical Association has consistently supported
modification of the law for the reason that it has long been responsible
and competent medical practice to advise termination of pregnancy
where the woman's health is at stake, or where it is likely that the
child will be born with a serious defect, so long as this procedure
does not offend the moral and religious beliefs of the woman and her
family.78 A recent sample taken and reported through the Stanford
School of Law confirmed that abortion on these grounds in most non-
Catholic hospitals in California was common practice.79 Even the
opposition witnesses before the California Assembly Criminal Pro-
76 Sands, supra note 71, at 287 n.15.
77 Id. n.16. .g., California State Junior Chamber of Commerce; contra Costa
Council for Responsible Parenthood; American Association of University Women, Cal.
Division; 1960, 1962 and 1966 Los Angeles County Grand Juries.
78 "MDs Seek Abortion Law Change," Medical World News, April 19, 1966, p. 56,
reports "support from the overwhelming majority of delegates at the CMA's (California
Medical Association) annual (1966) meeting" for reform abortion legislation, and that
"more than 85% of the nation's psychiatrists who responded to a survey favor the
easing of abortion laws." Those favoring abortion in the psychiatrists' poll numbered
5,241; the survey was conducted by the nationally known Association for the Study
of Abortion, composed of clergymen, doctors, lawyers, and laymen.
79 Packer & GampbelI, "Therapeutic Abortion-A Problem in Law and Medicine,"
11 Stan. L. Rev. 417 (1959).
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cedure Committee admitted that the proposed bill would only make
legal what is current medical practice. 0
It must be noted, however, that such medical treatment is far
from being universally available; it is considerably limited in nature.
Most women do not have the means or the contacts to be channelled
to the particular doctor and hospital where existing law might be
stretched or violated. The restrictive law particularly results in dis-
crimination against the poor. 1 Hospital therapeutic abortion com-
mittees tend to limit approval to compelling cases presented by their
own staff members, in which there is no possibility of publicity or
trouble coming to the hospital.82
The restrictiveness of non-Catholic hospitals also depends upon
the temper of the times.83 At this writing there is considerable dialogue
reported in the press concerning violations of the anti-abortion law in
California by reputable physicians, much of which is instituted by
prominent Catholic obstetricians.84 Although there is no record of
prosecution of a licensed physician who, with concurring medical
opinion and approval of a hospital committee, terminated pregnancy
in a licensed hospital, prosecutions were recently threatened for such
abortions performed when German measles were contracted in early
pregnancy.85 Disciplinary proceedings were recently instituted before
the State Board of Medical Examiners against a number of doctors
who performed such abortions. Some members of the Board are the
very persons who contributed to the public dialogue directed at the
accused physicians. It is our recent experience that this publicity and
disciplinary action have served to severely curtail hospital abortions
in California. Patients with sufficient means are being referred out-
of-state for medical treatment. Perhaps this was the ultimate goal of
those who caused the disciplinary proceedings and dialogue to be
instituted.
The attitude of the general public favors a broadening of the law
of therapeutic abortion. This is indicated not only by the high incidence
80 Transcript of hearings before the California Assembly Interim Committee on
Criminal Procedure, held Dec. 17 & 18, 1962, in San Diego, Hon. John A. O'Connell,
Chairman, presiding.
81 Hall, "Therapeutic Abortion, Sterilization and Contraception," 91 Am. J. Obst. &
Gyn. 518 (1965), shows twenty times more abortions in private cases than in the wards
and clinics; Niswander, "Medical Abortion Practices in the United States," 17 IV. Res. L.
Rev. 403, 405 (1965).
82 Niswander, supra note 81, at 418.
83 Ibid.
84 Reports in Los Angeles Times: March 22, 1966, § 1, p. 4, col. 4; June 16, 1966,
§ 1, p. 3, col. 3; June 24, 1966, § 1, p. 4, col. 4; June 27, 1966, § 1, p. 3, col. 1.
85 Ibid.
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of illegal abortion, but also by the voluminous professional literature
now urging a change, by the increasing dialogue in the public com-
munications media decrying the ills of existing law, and by the recent
wide-spread support of the medical and related professions for
measures such as the Beilenson Bill. As in California, physicians in
New York State recently indicated overwhelming support for a change
in the law.86 The Association for the Study of Abortion, headquartered
in New York City, was formed in 1964 and has a professional member-
ship from all over the country. 7 Other groups have been formed in
California for the specific purpose of changing the law.", For a direct
sampling of public opinion, a recent CBS nationwide survey found
that a majority of those with opinions favored "relaxation of existing
abortion laws." '
In July, 1966, the highly respected California Poll, headed by
Mervin D. Field, conducted a state-wide survey throughout California
and found that fifty-six percent of the general public favored lib-
eralizing the abortion law, as opposed to twenty-five percent favoring
the existing laws. Among Roman Catholics, forty-six percent favored
liberalization and thirty-six percent favored restrictive laws. The
major news media in California have editorialized in favor of broaden-
ing the lawful indications for therapeutic abortion, including the
reputable Los Angeles Times, the major San Francisco newspapers, and
the CBS and ABC television and radio outlets in Los Angeles.
The Conference of Delegates to the California State Bar Con-
vention, in September of 1966, recommended by an overwhelming
majority the enactment of Assemblyman Beilenson's Therapeutic
Abortion Act. The Conference was comprised of nearly one thousand
lawyers from all over the state who were delegates and alternate
delegates to the State Bar Convention.
B. Religious Opposition
The only organized opposition to reforming the law of ther-
apeutic abortion comes from the leadership of the Catholic Church
86 Hall, "New York Abortion Law Survey," 93 Am. J. Obst. & Gyn. 1182 (1965).
The New York Academy of Medicine also has recently endorsed legislation similar to
the Beilenson Bill. See New York Academy of Medicine, Therapeutic Abortion (1964).
87 Lader, Abortion 148 (1966).
88 University Women for Humane Abortion Law; California Committee on
Therapeutic Abortion; Society for Humane Abortion; California Committee to Legalize
Abortion. See also Sands, supra note 71, at 287, for others supporting legislation.
8D Broadcast throughout the U.S. on the CBS television show "National Health
Quiz" on the eve of Jan. 18, 1966; 43% favored relaxation, 39% opposed it, 18%o had
no opinion.
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and its hospitals."' A number of organizations vigorously opposed
the Beilenson Bill in California, but they have all manifested the
religious philosophy of the Roman Catholic Church. 1 Even the
ostensibly medical and legal arguments proffered by these groups
bear the same stamp of theological doctrine.2
The Church's opposition to abortion historically is based on the
doctrine of original sin, that a child would die without the sacra-
ment of baptism; thus condemning it to eternal punishment.9 3 This
is still recognized, but it is not used as an argument against abortion.
Instead, the Church contends that the embryo is a human being from
the moment of conception, and its directly induced destruction is an
intentional homicide of an innocent person." Obviously, this view
is stricter than existing law.
The legal argument presented by Catholic opponents starts with
the basic premise that a human being exists from conception. 5 Upon
this premise rests the remainder of the argument: namely, that the
embryo or fetus is a "person" entitled to all the rights and protection of
constitutional law normally given to other human beings no longer in
their mothers' wombs; more particularly, the so-called "right to be
born."
Much precedent is cited to buttress the basic premise. It consists
of cases which recognize the right of a child to sue for pre-natal
injuries, and which recognize a child in gestation for purposes of
inheritance or appointment of a guardian.96 But such precedent is
inapplicable here, since the so-called "rights" of the child mature only
if it is born in a viable state. In every one of these cases, without
exception, the interests of mother and child coincide; every party
concerned wants the child to be born. Even in the recent New Jersey
90 George, "Current Abortion Laws: Proposals and Movements for Reform," 17
W. Res. L. Rev. 371 (1966); Kummer & Leavy, "Therapeutic Abortion Law Confusion,"
195 J. Am. Med. Assoc. 96, 99 (1966) ; Lader, Abortion 75, 93, 165 (1966).
91 Sands, supra note 71, at 287 n.18. E.g., Catholic Physician Guild; Guild of
Catholic Psyciatrists; St. Thomas More Society; California Council of Catholic Hospitals;
Catholic Parent Teacher's Ass'n.
92 Sands, supra note 71.
93 Supra note 27; Williams, The Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin 221 (1957).
94 Ibid.
95 E.g., Byrne, "A Critical Look at Legalized Abortion," 41 Los Angeles B. Bull.
320 (1966). It is instructive to note that a number of Catholic opponents of reform
legislation insist upon referring to the measure involved as "legalized abortion" no
matter how conservative the bill may be, in an apparent attempt to lead people to
believe the legislation in reality means abortion merely for the asking.
96 Drinan, "The Inviolability of the Right to be Born," 17 W. Res. L. Rev. 465,
46$ (1965).
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case,°7 where the court appointed a guardian and ordered transfusions
for the pregnant mother who had refused on religious grounds, every-
one (including the mother) wanted the child to live; the court stressed
the importance of physicians being able to administer necessary,
competent and accepted medical treatment. On the other hand, where
therapeutic abortion is requested, the interests of the pregnant woman
and the fetus are antagonistic.
We have found no precedent anywhere in the United States which
challenges the constitutionality of the present exception to the pro-
hibitory law, whether it involves preservation of life or health. Counsel
to the California Legislature explored the matter fully and found no
constitutional flaw, such as impinging the "rights" of the fetus, in the
Beilenson Bill or in its predecessors.98 Similarly, the American Law
Institute, in its comprehensive studies spanning many years and
leading to the reformed abortion sections of the Model Penal Code,
did not even mention the issue of constitutionality.
99
All this leads one author, who was counsel to the committee which
conducted hearings on the Beilenson Bill, to question the sincerity
of the opposition in raising this issue; to question "whether the
opposition truly believes there is a constitutional issue involved, or is
only making a desperate attempt to justify its opposition to the
Therapeutic Abortion Act for other than religious reasons." 100
Indeed, the basic premise of the opposition is the subject of
widespread and responsible difference of opinion; even theologians
differ. Nearly every opposition argument begins with an attempt to
center the discussion around "what one thinks of a human embryo or
fetus,"'01 1 or what is described as an absolute and scientific fact that
"human life begins at conception."'09 Yet, it is far from absolute
fact; it falls in the realm of opinion, has been debated for centuries
and is still being debated without resolution. 0 3
Testimony taken in 1965 before the California Assembly Criminal
Procedure Committee, as reported in a recent paper, indicates that
97 Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201
A.2d 537 (1964).
98 Unpublished opinions: Ops. Leg. Counsel No. 18587 of May 19, 1963; Ops.
Leg. Counsel No. 1673 of July 16, 1964.
99 Model Penal Code § 207.11, comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
100 Sands, supra note 71, at 306.
101 Drinan, supra note 96, at 465.
102 Byrne, "The Legal Rights of the Unborn Child," 41 Los Angeles B. Bull. 24
(1965).
103 Lader, Abortion 75 (1966) ; Sands, supra note 71, at 294.
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the assumption that the embryo is a distinct life from conception is
actually a presumption.
[S]ince no one can say positively when life begins, the Church
maintains that it must presume that life begins at conception until
proven otherwise. Only in this way can the Church be sure that
the child is protected from the time life begins, whenever that
occurs. Thus the Canon Law is explicit though there is no dogma on
the point.104
C. Ultimately a Balancing of Interests
We believe that the argument finally resolves itself to a balancing
of the interests of those who favor the birth of the fetus, on the one
hand, against the interests of the pregnant woman, her family and
society, on the other. The basis of the opposition's argument, firmly
and historically grounded in religious doctrine and dogma, confirms
this position.
Dating from the original biblical command to "be fruitful and
multiply,"'1 5 the ancient Hebrews and then the early Christians, a
persecuted sect, counted on increasing their numbers to gain strength
and extend their influence and monotheistic beliefs. The prophets
and theologians spoke about morality, but increasing the population
definitely was a factor in outlawing abortion. 1'
In the development of Judaic and Christian dogma an aura of sin
surrounded the sexual relationship, dating from the story of Adam
and Eve, when entered into for any reason other than procreation.
The Immaculate Conception was Godly in nature, and instructed that
although man participated in the reproductive process he did so upon
the command of his Maker. Conception, therefore, though the result
of the lustful act of man, is of divine purpose and not to be interfered
with in any manner.
In vast areas of the world, outside the orbit of Judaism and
Christianity, by way of contrast, there is no such dogma or debate
to trouble the public or private conscience. Shintoism recognizes a
child as a human being when it has "seen the light of day."'05 Islam
holds that life begins in the fetus only after 150 days.'0 Lader
reports, "Neither Buddhist nor Hindu theology contains any scriptural
104 Sands, supra note 71, at 294.
105 Genesis 1:28.
108 Breitenecker, "Abortion in the German-Speaking Countries of Europe," 17
W. Res. L. Rev. 553 (1965).
107 Lader, Abortion 94 (1966).
108 Ibid.
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prohibitions against early abortion, treating it as a social rather than
religious issue. In fact, the Indian government in 1965 began to
investigate the legalization of all abortion, modeled on the Japanese
system, as part of its policy on population control."'0 9
Over the centuries, not even the Catholic position has remained
constant, for the Church constantly has adapted to changing forces.
Continual debate took place over when the soul entered the fetus, to
establish the point at which the death of the fetus without baptism
occurred." 0 Canon Law at different stages did not punish abortion
during the forty-day period after conception for males, and during
the eighty-day period for females, although it is not known how
sex of the fetus was determined in advance."' As late as 1869 abortion
was punished only if undertaken after the fetus animated, in conformity
with the common law of that day. In that year, however, Pope Pius
IX eliminated all distinction between the animated and non-animated
fetus, and the forty and eighty-day rules; he held all abortion to be
murder.12 Subsequently, Pope Pius XI, in his Casti Connubii of
1930, condemned all attempts to limit offspring as acts against nature.
Lader believes that the latter Pope's stringent position on abortion
was "undoubtedly linked to the growing threat of contraception" and
the birth control movements sweeping European countries with large
Catholic populations." 3 But the prior 1869 decision, he maintains,
was based in part on a radical shift in Catholic theology on the ensoul-
ment of the fetus, probably impelled by new biological research. It
marked the beginning of the moral offensive, however, which in a
few decades developed into open warfare by the Church against birth
control on a broad political and social level.
Thus, Catholicism is deeply committed to its present position
in attempting to preserve the interests of the fetus and its ultimate
birth, to the exclusion of all other interests. By the same token, the
Church, at this writing, still refuses officially to acknowledge the
existence of a population problem which will require broad-scale
solutions. This is changing, however, as the Church has always
adapted itself to world pressures, though reluctantly perhaps; increas-
ingly we are made aware of voices within the hierarchy which give
recognition to the grave problems posed by our rapidly expanding
109 Ibid.
11o Supra note 27; Lader, Abortion 79, 185 n.9 (1966).
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid.
113 Lader, Abortion 80 (1966).
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population. The Church is beginning to recognize at least the right of
non-Catholics to limit their numbers, and to promulgate this as social
policy if large numbers of responsible people desire it.
On the other hand, many responsible people in our society-
though they have increasing sympathy for the fetus as it grows more
human in form, and consider it immoral to terminate pregnancy at
one stage or another-under certain compelling circumstances sincerely
believe the interests of the woman and her family, and even the
interests of a seriously deformed or deprived newborn, outweigh
their feelings for the fetus. When the fetus endangers the health of
the woman, such people will have less tendency to believe that it is a
human being to be protected in the constitutional sense. In such
circumstances, a piece of tissue will not be sanctified as human life
by many persons. The woman's life has far more value for what she
is than fetal tissue for what it might become." 4
D. Humanitarian Indications
Where pregnancy results from sexual assault, aside from any
danger to the woman's health or likelihood that the child will be born
deformed, it seems hardly necessary to point out the manifest injustice
in existing law, which compels the birth of the product of a monstrous
aqt.
The arguments of the Catholic opposition border on the ridiculous,
and attempt to sweep aside this aspect of the abortion problem as an
emotional approach of the proponents of modification.11C For example,
it is maintained that all forcible rape involves some element of consent
on the part of the woman, however little it be." 6 This, of course,
disregards the traditional accepted element of forcible rape which
vitiates consent, i.e., the threat of great and immediate bodily harm
accompanied by the apparent ability to carry out the threat.
Sexual intercourse with an unmarried female under the age of
consent, more commonly known as "statutory rape", is a criminal
offense throughout the United States, with the age of consent usually
being set by statute at sixteen or eighteen years.1 Intercourse is
114 Id. at 102.
115 Drinan, supra note 96, at 468.
116 Quay, "Justifiable Abortion-Medical and Legal Foundations," 49 Geo. LJ.
395, 399 (1961).
117 Model Penal Code § 207.4(10), comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955): Seven
years, one state; twelve years, two states; fourteen years, one state; sixteen years,
twenty-three states; seventeen years, one state; eighteen years, twenty-one states;
twenty-one years, one state.
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entered into with the actual consent of the girl, otherwise the more
serious charge of forcible rape would be involved. The final draft of
the Model Penal Code, after much discussion and questioning, includes
statutory rape as an indication for termination of pregnancy.118 Not
only the Catholic Church opposes this, but some non-Catholic
authorities raise the possibility of any girl under eighteen obtaining an
abortion for the asking.119
We disagree with the opposition and urge adoption of the Model
Penal Code concept. Whenever consent to the sex act is involved, the
Puritan obsession with sex and immorality rears its head. The argu-
ment is that when a young female becomes pregnant as the result
of engaging in the sinful act of sex for pleasure, she shall carry her
sin with her as a firm reminder of the wrong committed; this shall be a
deterrent to widespread promiscuity. In other words, in a society
where the sex symbol is uppermost, strict sexual morality shall be
enforced through fear of punishment.
We do not believe that the present law of abortion effectively acts
as such a deterrent. 20 Moreover, the harm done to the young girl, to
the father, to society, and mostly to a child brought into the world
under these circumstances, in most cases far outweighs any impropriety
in terminating such a pregnancy. Again, it is a matter of balancing
the interests, and we believe this is a decision to be made by the
pregnant girl, perhaps the man who impregnated her, and their
families, not by the legislature.
It is our experience that incest is almost always committed upon
young girls, at least in those cases which come to light. It seems hardly
cogent that existing abortion laws will deter the male member of a
family who has easy access to a young female relative whose morals
and conscience have not already deterred him. Not infrequently, the
young girl is mentally retarded, and being more sheltered within the
home makes her an easy target for a frustrated male in the same
household. Such circumstances compound the injustice and harm to
all concerned by forcing the pregnancy to term.
In the case of minors, we believe the law has a special duty, not
only to the young girl but to society as well. Until the state legislatures
in this country act to alleviate these hardships, we have offered a new
and different approach through the courts, as set forth in the last
section of this paper.
118 Model Penal Code § 2303(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
119 Sands, supra note 71, at 300.
120 Lader, Abortion 163 (1966).
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E. True Function of Law
Criminal law should not undertake to draw the line where religion
or morals would draw it. There appears to be widespread disagree-
ment among honest and responsible people as to moral standards with
respect to abortion, ranging from deep religious conviction on one
hand to purely scientific and utilitarian views on the other, with a
majority middle group of medical judgment and public opinion favoring
relaxation of the present laws. Use of the criminal law contrary to a
substantial body of public opinion is definitely alien to our basic
principles, as criminal punishment traditionally has been reserved for
behavior falling below the universally accepted standards of conduct.
Moral demands on human behavior, over which there is wide dif-
ference of opinion, can be stricter than those of the generally accepted
criminal law, because violations of those higher standards do not carry
the grave consequences of penal offenses. We therefore submit that
strict moral and religious standards should not be imposed upon the
people in the form of felony statutes.
Even Catholics differ among themselves as to whether legislation
should be urged to enact religious doctrine.""- Cardinal Cushing and
others have counseled that Catholics should not attempt to impose
their moral position on non-Catholics.:" Others, however, from our
experience with opposition to the Beilenson Bill, strongly urge the
adoption of the Catholic viewpoint. 23
We submit that the legislature cannot and should not attempt
to legislate a moral philosophy grounded in religious dogma and
offensive to substantial numbers of responsible persons in our com-
munity; witness the experience with Prohibition. The legislature is
on equally shaky ground when it attempts to force the public to
believe that terminating pregnancy at an early stage is morally wrong,
no matter what may be the reason.
Furthermore, the legislature should not undertake to make a
medical decision based upon the objection of the Catholic hospitals
that the proposed modifications of the law are medically unsound.
It should be enough that a majority of the medical profession con-
siders certain indications for therapeutic abortion within the scope of
competent, acceptable and sound medical practice. Unless the legis-
lature is prepared to fix standards in all areas of medicine where some
121 Sands, supra note 71, at 296.
122 Lader, Abortion 93 (1966).
123 Drinan, supra note 96, at 478, candidly admits the basic issue is "what or whose
moral values should the law endorse or enforce?"
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medical opposition exists, then why should the law interpose itself
between doctor and patient in this area? 4
Qualified physicians, particularly obstetricians and gynecologists,
cannot operate honestly within the framework of current abortion laws.
The threat of prosecution under these laws hangs over their heads
when in reality the community has no intention of punishing medical
practitioners acting in good faith. The present statutory standard
does not adequately meet the needs of the physician who decides that
induced abortion is necessary for his patient. Hence, medical men
are often uncertain about the consequences of terminating pregnancy.
The law should be brought into closer conformity with public need
and the practices of reputable members of the medical profession.
The statutes should clearly set out what constitues lawful therapeutic
abortion in order that physicians and surgeons have clear guideposts
on which to base sound medical judgment.
Unfortunately, the nature of the Catholic opposition to modifica-
tion of the law of therapeutic abortion is increasingly incurring wide-
spread resentment. No one would deny the right of religionists to
preach their beliefs from the pulpit, the press, or any other public
medium. But there is an enormous difference between persuasion and
promulgation of ideas and the blockbuster tactics used by the Catholic
hierarchy in a number of states to frustrate reform.' 25 Would the
same methods be employed by others to force their views upon
Catholics through penal law? Certainly there would be a hue and cry
from the Church over such restriction of religious freedom.
Recently in New Hampshire, as reported by Lader, "Every type
of political in-fighting was directed at legislators and governors to
block reform legislation," and lamentably, the New Hampshire law-
makers voted strictly down religious lines.12 6 In this state, and
previously in New York, tremendous political pressure was brought
to bear on the respective governors by the Catholic hierarchy to veto
the reform bills already passed by the legislatures, thus frustrating
much-needed modification of the law.
The people of the State of California have also been subjected to
these tactics for the last three regular sessions of the legislature. More
recently, the emotional and religious fervor of some prominent
Catholic obstetricians, who have been outspoken against changing
the law, has spilled over into bitter charges within the medical pro-
fession. At this writing, administrative disciplinary proceedings are
124 Sands, supra note 71, at 297-99.
125 Lader, Abortion 165 (1966).
126 Id. at 112, 165.
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pending against nine licensed physicians in the San Francisco area
for terminating pregnancies in women who contracted German measles
in the first trimester, in order to avoid the birth of deformed children. 7
Though perhaps violations of the penal law, strictly speaking, the
abortion procedures undertaken by these doctors were within the
currently accepted standards of sound medical practice. It appears
from the defense funds established and the number of physicians
stepping forward to help, that the medical profession is rallying to
assist those accused.
We must conclude that if the tactics of the opposition are suc-
cessful in resisting modification of the law of therapeutic abortion,
we must look to the courts for clarification.
III. SoME NE w APPROACHES TO THE LAW OF
THERAPEUTIC ABORTION
The inability of existing laws to meet the needs of society and
modern medical concepts and the pressure tactics of opponents to
legal reform have had two prominent effects: (1) therapeutic abortion
is quietly undertaken by reputable physicians in many licensed
hospitals, though not in strict conformity with the penal laws; but not
on a scale great enough to include most women who, except for their
socio-economic status, would otherwise receive relief; (2) a search
is underway for new approaches, in addition to legislation, by which
the law may be brought into conformity with current medical practice
and the mores of the community.
When a woman and her husband consult their family doctor or
obstetrician, and he believes that the woman's pregnancy and birth
of the child will endanger her health and perhaps that of the family,
and other responsible physicians concur in this opinion, and the parents
desire to follow their physician's advice, which does not offend their
moral or religious beliefs, then why should the law step in to frustrate
their decision? Similarly, when, through modern medical knowledge,
a man and wife learn at an early stage of pregnancy that a seriously
deformed child may be brought into the world, and they choose not
to take this risk of hardship to all the family as well as to the child
itself, then again, why must the law intrude to prevent them from
making this most crucial decision affecting the entire family?
Medically speaking, a young girl, whether the victim of rape,
incest or misguided. morals, may be seriously affected by the trauma
of an unwanted pregnancy and childbirth when she is not mature
enough to cope with it, let alone be an adequate mother to a child
127 Los Angeles Times, supra note 84.
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which society rejects. Nor is it any solution to force her to give away
her own flesh after she has carried it to term; this may only compound
her problem and that of her family.
Society has no real interest in the product of these situations, so
long as the parents concur. The demographers tell us we are far
removed from any need to increase our numbers, but we must slow the
pace of procreation in order to perpetuate a reasonable human
existence on this planet. Society should be, and in fact is, more
concerned with the health and welfare of those already in existence
than those who might be born into one of these three situations. These
circumstances call for the most personal, private and soul-searching
decision a family can make. They may need medical and perhaps
religious guidance, but the decision ultimately must be made by
the family members involved who may be affected for the remainder
of their lives. The state should not intrude with such an impersonal
and inflexible decision for them, without regard to the circumstances.
Every rule has its limit, dependent upon the nature of extenuating
facts.
A. Historical Purpose of Anti-Abortion Laws
The purpose of the anti-abortion laws is to protect the woman
from unskilled abortionists operating outside the ambit of accepted
medical practice. Their purpose is not to frustrate the family in
seeking and following competent and accepted medical advice. Their
purpose is not to prevent responsible and honest physicians from
prescribing and undertaking such treatment when medically sound.
The abortion statutes of most jurisdictions do not mention medical
standards or the role of the licensed physician. 2 The codes and
case law formulate rules obviously designed to protect the woman
from those who would harm her for a profit.'29 This is as it should be.
Abortion was openly advertised and performed in this country
as an "established custom" until at least the Civil War period.130
The common law did not make abortion, with consent of the woman,
a criminal offense until after the fetus had quickened or turned in the
womb, and then only a misdemeanor.' 3 ' It was common knowledge
that at the stage of pregnancy when the fetus quickened, it became
128 See Sands, supra note 71, at Appendix B.
129 See notes 16-21 supra and related text.
130 Lader, Abortion 85 (1966).
131 Commonwealth v. Parker, 50 Mass. (9 Met.) 263 (1845); State v. Murphy, 27
N.JL. 112 (Sup. Ct. 1858); 3 Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England 32
(1883); Model Penal Code § 207.11, at 148, comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
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considerably more dangerous to terminate pregnancy. The law thus
was designed, in part, to protect the woman when the danger to her
was great.
But the scope of medical knowledge and experience began to
broaden rapidly, and abortion could be performed by doctors under
conditions which presented less danger to women. Shortly before the
Civil War, as states began departing from the common law with anti-
abortion statutes, the concept of the legal, medical abortion came
into being. The new laws, it is contended, were part of the increas-
ingly greater role governments were taking in the protection of the
health and safety of their citizens; the new abortion acts were intended
primarily to provide protection against swarms of hack abortionists
who were endangering the lives of women."'
The New Jersey Supreme Court, in 1858, held, in State v.
Murphy,3 3 that at common law abortion with consent of the woman
was not an indictable offense before the fetus quickened. But examina-
tion of the new law,134 the court said, "will show clearly that the
mischief designed to be remedied by the statute was the supposed
defect in the common law .... ,,135
The design of the statute was not to prevent the procuring of
abortions, so much as to guard the health and life of the mother
against the consequences of such attempts . . . .The offense
of third persons, under the statute, is mainly against her life and
health. The statute regards her as the victim of crime, not as the
criminal; as the object of protection, rather than of punishment.13
The desire to enforce stricter moral standards also may have
played a part in the enactment of some of the new anti-abortion laws,
since many of them were adopted in the same era as the Comstock
Act, enacted by Congress in 1873 for the "Suppression of Trade in,
and Circulation of, Obscene Literature and Articles of Immoral Use".
The Comstock Act was "part of a continuous scheme to suppress
immoral articles and obscene literature,"' 7 including any item the
132 Lader, Abortion 87, 88 (1966).
133 27 NJ.L. 112.
134 Id. at 113: "(I)f any person or persons maliciously or without lawful justifi-
cation, with intent to cause and procure the miscarriage of a woman then pregnant with
child, shall administer to her, prescribe for her, or advise or direct her to take or
swallow any poison, drug, medicine, or noxious thing ....
135 Id. at 114.
136 Ibid.
137 United States v. One Package, 86 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1936), interpreting the Corn-
stock Act of 1873, ch. 258, 17 Stat. 598 (1873).
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purpose of which is "prevention of conception or for causing abor-tion. M 3 8
The Comstock Act has been interpreted by a Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals as not applicable to the licensed physician acting
within the accepted medical practices of the day: In United States v.
One Package,1 39 pessaries had been imported from Japan by a doctor
for experimentation in her practice. In the opinion written by Augustus
N. Hand, and concurred in by Justices Swan and Learned Hand, it
was held that medical knowledge available to Congress in this field
was considerably limited in 1873. The court accepted the medical
soundness of prescribing the prevention of pregnancy by contraception
for health reasons. Judge Hand, in writing for the court said that the
Comstock Act embraced
only such articles as Congress would have denounced as immoral if
it had understood all the conditions under which they were to be
used. Its design, in our opinion, was not to prevent the importation,
sale, or carriage by mail of things which might intelligently be
employed by conscientious and competent physicians for the purpose
of saving life or promoting the well-being of their patients .... [I] t
is going far . . . to hold that abortions, which destroy incipient
life, may be allowed in proper cases, and yet that no measures may
be taken to prevent conception even though a likely result should
be to require termination of pregnancy by means of an operation.
It seems unreasonable to suppose that the national scheme of legis-
lation involves such inconsistencies and requires the complete
suppression of articles, the use of which in many cases is advocated
by such a weight of authority in the medical world.140
B. California Decisions
The appellate courts in California, as have the statutes of
Oregon and Louisiana,141 have tended recently to place the licensed
medical doctor in a different and more favorable category than the
abortionist who is not acting within accepted medical practice. When
a physician testified that he terminated a woman's pregnancy because
it was "necessary to preserve her life,"'4 the prosecutor had a greater
burden of proof as to an element of the offense, that the abortion was
not necessary to save the woman's life, than he would have had if the
138 19 U.S.C. § 1305.
139 86 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1936).
140 Id. at 739-40.
141 Supra notes 49, 50, 60-62 and related text.
142 It is a felony in California to procure, or attempt to procure, an abortion by
any means whatsoever "unless the same is necessary to preserve her life." Cal. Pen. Code
§ 274.
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defendant had been without medical credentials. 43 In the face of
the doctor's testimony as to the necessity of abortion, buttressed with
concurring opinions of other examining physicians, it is difficult, if
not a practical impossibility, for the prosecution to prove the specific
criminal intent necessary for conviction, i.e., the specific intent to
terminate a pregnancy for a reason other than to preserve the woman's
life. 4
People v. Ballard held that in the case of a medical doctor, the
exception "to preserve her life" does not require that peril to life be
imminent. 145
It ought to be enough that the dangerous condition 'be potentially
present even though its full development might be delayed to a
greater or less extent. Nor was it essential that the doctor believe
that the death of the patient would be otherwise certain in order
to justify him in affording present relief.146
If the appellant in performing the operation did something
which was recognized and approved by those reasonably skilled in
his profession practicing in the same community, then it cannot
be said that the operation was not necessary to preserve the life
of the patient. '147
C. Griswold v. Connecticut: Tte Beginning of an Answer
The United States Supreme Court, in Griswold v. Connecticut,148
held the Connecticut birth control law' 49 unconstitutional as it applied
to the acts of the Director of the Planned Parenthood Center in New
Haven and of a licensed physician in providing information, instruction
and medical advice to married persons as to the means of preventing
conception. The striking similarity of the anti-abortion laws and the
Connecticut anti-contraceptive statute is too patent to be overlooked, 10
143 People v. Ballard, 167 Cal. App. 2d 803, 335 P.2d 204 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
See also a subsequent prosecution, People v. Ballard, 218 Cal. App. 2d, 295, 32 Cal. Rptr.
233 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
144 People v. Abarbanel, 239 Adv. Cal. App. 24, 48 Cal. Rptr. 336 (Dist. Ct. App.
1969).
145 167 Cal. App. 2d 803, 814, 335 P.2d 204, 212 (1959).
146 Ibid.
147 Id. at 815, 335 P.2d at 812.
148 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
149 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53-32 (1960): "Any person who uses any drug,
medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception shall be fined
not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one year
or be both fined and imprisoned." Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-196 (1960): "Any person
who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires or commands another to commit any offense
may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender."
150 Emerson, "Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine," 64 Mch. L. Rev. 219 (1965).
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and this landmark decision may offer some guidance as to what the
courts will do when the constitutionality of the abortion laws is chal-
lenged in the proper case.
Griswold held that to punish the use of a contraceptive or anyone
who assisted in its use, would be an unconstitutional invasion of the
right of privacy guaranteed to husband and wife by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Preliminarily, the court held
that the defendants had standing to raise the question of the constitu-
tional rights of the married people with whom they had a professional
relationship.'
The opinion, written by Mr. Justice Douglas, and concurred in
by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Goldberg, Brennan, Harlan
and White, with Justices Black and Stewart dissenting, disclaimed any
intent on the part of the Court to "sit as a super-legislature to determine
the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems,
business affairs, or social conditions. This law, however, operates
directly on an intimate relation of husband and wife and their phy-
sician's role in one aspect of that relation .'5
2
Justice Douglas went on to develop the concept of the constitu-
tional right of privacy, by pointing out that specific guarantees in
the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those
guarantees that help give them life and substance.' 53 Various guarantees
create zones of privacy from governmental intrusion. The first amend-
ment allows freedom of association to the extent that disclosure of
membership lists cannot be compelled. The third amendment pro-
hibition of quartering soldiers in private homes is another facet of that
privacy. The fourth amendment protects privacy from unreasonable
searches and seizures by government. The fifth amendment provision
against self-incrimination enables a citizen to create a zone of privacy
which the government may not force him to surrender to his detriment.
The fourth and fifth amendments were held to protect against all
governmental invasion "of the sanctity of a man's home and the
privacies of life." Finally, the ninth amendment reserves to the
people any rights which have not been specifically enumerated in the
Constitution.
The Court stressed the fact that the defendants prescribed
contraception solely to married persons, 54 and concluded with the
151 381 U.S. 479, 481.
152 Id. at 482.
153 Id. at 484.
154 Id. at 480.
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following comments on the importance of the zone of privacy sur-
rounding the marital relationship:
The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within the
zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guar-
antees. And it concerns a law which, in forbidding the use of con-
traceptives rather than regulating their manufacture or sale, seeks
to achieve its goals by means having a maximum destructive impact
upon that relationship. Would we allow the police to search the
sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of
contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy
surrounding the marriage relationship.
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights-older
than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is
a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and
intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that pro-
motes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political
faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is
an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior
decisions.155
A comparison of the Connecticut law and a typical anti-abortion
statute leads to the conclusions that: (1) both statutes are at war
with currently accepted standards of medical practice; (2) both
statutes invade the sacred realm of marital privacy by denying married
couples the right to plan the future of their family; (3) both statutes
force the birth of deformed children, or leave abstinence as the
alternative; (4) both statutes are largely unenforced, nevertheless
prosecution hangs like a cloud over the medical profession; (5) both
statutes result in discrimination against people in lower economic
brackets; (6) both statutes are in conflict with one of the world's
most critical problems today, the population explosion; (7) both
statutes involve the imposition of a religious principle on the entire
community by government sanction. 156
This newly enunciated right of privacy evolved out of the need for
protecting the individual from the ultimate and absolute control of the
state. Its purpose is to reserve to married individuals the right to
plan a family themselves, to have or not to have children, without
the intrusion of the state in this decision. It emanates from substantive
due process and is one of the fundamental personal rights essential in
maintaining the independence, integrity and private development of
the citizen in a highly organized yet democratic society.5 7
155 Id. at 485-86.
156 Emerson, supra note 150.
157 Ibid.
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In summary, it appears that in the absence of legislation to bring
the law of therapeutic abortion into conformity with current medical
practice, the courts are beginning to recognize the need for removing
reputable physicians from the scope of the criminal abortion statutes
when those physicians are acting within the standards of accepted
medical practice and when they are involved with a personal, private
decision of the pregnant woman and her husband to follow the recom-
mendation of their doctor when it is accepted as medically sound.
The courts are beginning to recognize that the laws against criminal
abortion do not have as their purpose the frustration of those decisions
that are based on sound medical advice.
D. Relief for Minors under Existing Laws
Pregnancy in young girls often calls for special and sympathetic
treatment to alleviate the hardship to the girl and her family and
perhaps to the child who might be brought into the world under these
aggravated circumstances. The need for relief is especially great when
the pregnancy is the result of sexual assault. Most people are in
agreement, but it is rare for public officials and those involved in the
administration of justice to exercise the courage necessary to provide
such relief in the face of existing anti-abortion statutes.
The law has a special duty to protect minors, however, and to that
end the courts in this country assert jurisdiction over them to provide
necessities of life when otherwise unavailable, and this includes neces-
sary medical care to juvenile wards of the court. ee Thus, although the
exception to existing prohibitory abortion laws appears to be narrow,
strictly speaking, there remains sufficient breadth to include therapeutic
abortion for juveniles within the jurisdiction of the court. A recent
California case offers an example.
The California Juvenile Court Act gives the California Superior
Court, sitting as a juvenile court, jurisdiction over any person under the
age of twenty-one years "who is in need of proper and effective parental
care or control and has no parent or guardian, or has no parent or
guardian willing to exercise or capable of exercising such care or con-
trol, or has no parent or guardian actually exercising such care or
control." ''x 9 Other grounds for jurisdiction include lack of necessities, an
unfit home, or where the minor is dangerous to the public because of
some mental or physical deficiency. The Juvenile Court Act also pro-
vides the juvenile court with specific authority to authorize and consent
15s E.g., 2 AJ,.R.2d Dig. 297 (1956); Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d 506 (1963); Annot.,
85 A.L.R. 1099 (1933); Annot., 76 AL.R. 657 (1932).
159 Cal. Welfare & Inst'ns Code § 600.
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to neccessary medical care when there is no parent or other person
"standing in loco parentis capable or willing to authorize" such remedial
care or treatment for the minor.16 0
These provisions were invoked by the Superior Court of the State
of California, exercising its jurisdiction over a fourteen-year-old men-
tally retarded girl who had been forcibly raped by her brother and was
between four and five months pregnant at the time the pregnancy was
discovered.
A written opinion was submitted to the court by a psychiatrist
that the young girl could not understand the nature of her predicament;
that over the years she had developed an extremely close and sheltered
relationship with her mother which constituted the basis for an orderly
life in society outside an institution; that if this relationship were
destroyed or impaired, the girl would need to be institutionalized,
would suffer virtually an emotional death, and her physical life may be
somewhat shortened thereby; that the mother of the young girl was not
only distraught and on the borderline of psychosis as a result of the
impact of this event upon her, but also that her relationship with her
daughter was so strained that she indicated both homicidal and suicidal
tendencies; and that the life of the family was at stake. The psychiatrist
recommended therapeutic abortion, notwithstanding the late stage of
pregnancy.
The written opinion of a reputable obstetrician also recommended
therapeutic abortion, but he indicated that he would not undertake the
procedure unless it was in some way approved by a court of law. The
obstetrician also informed the court that the therapeutic abortion com-
mittee of his hospital would not approve the abortion unless sterilization
was performed at the same time.
The parents testified in the judge's chambers that they had at-
tempted for more than a month, through a number of doctors and hos-
pitals in the area, to secure a therapeutic abortion for their daughter,
but were refused in every case because of an impending "crackdown"
on abortions by the State Board of Medical Examiners. Local news-
papers had recently reported statements by prominent Catholic obste-
tricians to the effect that physicians were going to be held to the strict
letter of the law. The parents further indicated that they were of insuffi-
cient means to transport their daughter to another location where
abortion might be obtained.
After a full and complete consideration of these facts and existing
case law, including People v. Ballard,1 the court found the allegations
160 Cal. Welfare & Inst'ns Code §§ 739, 740.
161 Supra note 143.
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of the petition to be true, and "that [the] minor is in need of effective
parental care and control, that [the] parents are not capable of provid-
ing medical care and control needed by the minor in as much as it has
been necessary to obtain consent by the Court as well as by the parents
before medical and surgical processes indicated by Dr.... can be per-
formed." The court noted that recommendations had been made in
writing by qualified physicians "that the minor is in need of such medi-
cal and surgical care in order to preserve her life and well-being and
that of her parents." The court further found:
[T]hat both parents of [the] minor consent and agree to the decla-
ration of dependency and the necessity of surgical and medical care
as recommended in the written reports of the two doctors; that both
parents agree that to secure such necessary medical and surgical
care the consent of the Juvenile Court is required.
Therefore, it is the order of this Court that the minor be declared
a dependent child of the Court . . . and . . . consent is hereby
given to the performance . . . of a therapeutic termination of
pregnancy, as recommended, as necessary for the preservation of
the emotional and physical life of the minor and for such other
medical and surgical procedures as in his [the surgeon's] judgment
may be indicated.
Upon receipt of a certified copy of the court's order, the thera-
peutic abortion committee of the proposed hospital approved the pro-
cedure, and the hospital's attorney withdrew his objections. The young
girl was admitted, her pregnancy terminated, and a sterilization per-
formed.
CONCLUSION
If the opponents to legislative reform of the law of therapeutic
abortion are successful in perpetuating their religious and moral views
through penal law, in the face of currently accepted standards of medi-
cal practice and the mores of the public, as well as changing conditions
throughout the world, there is still sufficient room within existing law
to allow therapeutic abortion on grounds accepted by the overwhelming
majority of the medical profession. This change will come, however,
only when the present trend of case law comes further to fruition, to
remove the licensed physician and hospital from the scope of the penal
anti-abortion statutes, which have as their purpose the protection of
women from clandestine, unskilled abortionists. Society has no desire to
punish physicians for responsibly practicing medicine, nor to have its
government intrude upon the right of a family to make its own decision
when the health of the mother is involved, or when there is likelihood
of the birth of a seriously deformed child.
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Abortion will not be a mass birth control device in this country, as
a social policy, at any time in the foreseeable future. And although great
numbers of people in this country will continue to use criminal abortions
under septic conditions, performed by persons with dubious training, as
their own method of "personal population control," the incidence of
these abortions ultimately will be reduced with the increases in sex and
contraceptive education, adequate family planning programs, and in
the use of birth control devices.
